The military coup d’etat that that Sudanese armed forces announced they had thwarted on Tuesday, 21st of September 2021, must be viewed as an final warning to the Sudanese public to firmly flock to the streets to protect the glorious December revolution from the impending coup threat.
The impending coup d’etat is much more serious, and is being orchestrated by the military component of the transitional government, aided by civilians, remnants of the former regime, and regional actors.
This blueprint, orchestrating the evil slouch towards Khartoum, initiated operations with a series of preliminary practices that involved the manufacture and broadcast of terror into the Sudanese public through allowing lawlessness to become a norm in the country, and then accusing the civilian government of being negligent in allowing said lawlessness, despite it being the work of the military institution to uphold the citizen’s safety and well-being, whose own inclusion in the ruling transitional council was predicated upon provision of safety and security as per the constitution.
This role is particularly within their jurisdiction especially considering that the security and military reform that grants the civilian component of the ruling transitional council authority over the police and the security apparatus in the country has not been approved yet.
The most dangerous precursor to this anticipated coup d’etat is the manufactured crisis in eastern Sudan, which is being overtly led by the Leader of the Hadandawa tribe in Sudan Sayed Mohammed Tirk (a member of the dissolved/banned National Congress Party), and his cohorts, the remnants of the annihilated National Salvation regime, pulling the strings behind the scene.
All of this is being done under the watchful eyes of the coup orchestrating faction belonging to the military component.
Tirk has no political, logistical, or organizational powers that could enable him to pull off the sequestering of the eastern portion of the country, nor the shutdown of entire port operations in Port Sudan, the blocking of the national road linking between Khartoum and the east, the shutdown of the Port Sudan airport, and the closing of the oil pipelines.
News, supplemented by photos and videos, have revealed the regular force agents directly involved in directing the port closure and sending port employees back home instead of securing vital amenities.
Such actions cannot be carried out without green-lighting from the top of the military institution totem pole.
With all due respect to the prestigious Hadandawa tribe, but Tirk does not represent the various tribes in the east of Sudan, and does not represent the thoughts and opinions of Beja tribe leaders who have issued various statements condemning the Supreme Council of Beja Tribal Leaders and demanded that Tirk immediately stop speaking on their behalf, in a clear refutation of all that is going on in the eastern part of the country having anything to do with the majority of the social components and political currents who have organized massive rallies decrying Tirk’s actions, which have absolutely nothing to do with the fair developmental and political demands of the people of east Sudan.
Tirk only serves the putschist agenda with demands calling for “the resolution of the civilian government, the installation of a military regime, and the disbanding of the Empowerment Removal Committee.”
The most worrying of talks coming from the east are those concerning “fate” and “secession of east Sudan”.
This toying with national security, which is being participated in by foreign intelligence agencies, which threatens to puncture the lung of the country and its vital economic lifeline, has not been dealt with accordingly by the transitional government, who kept sending delegations to negotiate with Tirk instead of confronting the military faction that pulls the strings of the Tirk marionette and uses him to pressure the civilian government in, not only east Sudan, but the country as a whole, with similar calls for national road blocks and the disruption of oil production in West Kordofan by putschists, with the attempts still ongoing.
The speeches made by the head of the transitional council and his deputy – Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” (respectively) – after the failed coup attempt carry the indication that there is an inherent putschist agenda currently in the works.
Al-Burhan and Hemedti are supposedly two survivors of the coup d’etat attempt, and therefore it only makes sense for them to direct all their anger towards the putschists who would have either imprisoned them or placed them before a firing squad had the coup attempt proved itself a success, and for them to direct the Sudanese public to stand strong against these attempts at overthrowing the Sudanese government.
Instead however, al-Burhan and Hemedti both elected to direct all their anger towards their partner in the ruling council, the civilian part of the transitional government, pinning the responsibility of the failed coup attempt solely on it, and attributing the attempt to overtake the government on its many internal divisions, its failure to provide for the well-being of the Sudanese public, and even going as far as accusing it of “kidnapping the revolution and not being serious in holding elections”, in an attempt to provide reasons that would help legitimize any incoming coup d’etat.
Due to all this, work must be put in to help prevent the incoming coup d’etat through unifying and fortifying the national front that aligns itself with democratic transition and the successful completion of the transitional period, which should serve as the basis of the establishment of a permanent democracy in Sudan.
In this context, the first and foremost duty of the civilian component is to return back to the streets, where the revolution had started, and to firmly align itself with it within the framework of correcting the transitional journey through secluding and confronting putschists belonging to both military and civilian factions, unifying democrats belonging to both military and civilian factions, and putting the battle for the military and security sector reform back on the right track: A key national demand to guarantee what’s best for the Sudanese people in terms of security, politics, and the economy, instead of portraying it as a free-for-all, absolute fight against the entire military institution.
The patriotic and honorable military men in Sudan benefit when their people benefit, and they favor the formation of a single, unified, national army with a new battle philosophy aimed at preserving both national borders and the democratic order.
The upcoming putschist threat necessitates the Sudanese public immediately returns to the streets that birthed the revolution before it’s too late.