After the Abdel Fattah al-Burhan-led coup last year, many of faces belonging to the previous dissolved regime have come to the spotlight once more, with many of them occupying important government positions.
The faces of the old Omar al-Bashir regime that had been overthrown in the 2019 protests have returned to the government after over three years spent in hiding.
The 25th October 2021 military coup d’etat that was led by army general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan paved the way for this return.
Against the Revolutionary Tide
Sources told AlTaghyeer that the return of the Falol (the name given to the remaining members of the annihilated National Salvation regime who have yet to be brought to justice) was the doing of an arranged coordination between them and the putschist authority, in an effort by the coup leader al-Burhan to resist the rising revolutionary tide that threatens his control over the government in Sudan.
In return, al-Burhan would guarantee the Falol the return of the dissolved and outlawed National Congress Party, and grant them protection from attempts by the now disbanded Empowerment Removal Committee to bring them to custody and seize their assets.
The sources also stated that instability was rife in the army, especially among low ranking soldiers due to the troubled waters the putschist authorities are leading the country into.
Al-Burhan therefore had no choice but to seek Ikhwani security personnel as a last resort to help combat the intensifying revolutionary tide looming over his head, at a time where his distrust of the popular armed movements and the Rapid Support Forces (Janjaweed) is at an all time low, especially with the latter’s leader, Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) having been making moves to consolidate power in Sudan all to himself.
Popular Defense Forces
AlTaghyeer discovered that members of the Popular Security Forces have returned to work, after the notorious organization’s members came out from hiding that lasted for over three years.
The sources said that Al-Burhan struck a deal that paved the way for the return of one of the Popular Defense founders, Abdullah Idris, from hiding in Turkey.
The resurgence of the movement’s members was also evident in the dismissal of the former Governor of Khartoum, appointed by resigned Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, and his replacement, by Hamdok also, with a well-known Popular Defense member Ahmed Othman Hamza.
Coup leader al-Burhan also appointed popular defense leader Brigadier General Nasr al-Din al-Ghattas as Director of Media for the General Intelligence Service, on the recommendation of Director General of the GIS Ahmed Ibrahim Mufaddal.
Sources believe the move explains Al-Burhan’s desire to silence the press through using Al-Ghattas for intimidation, who they described as “one of the worst humans” to have worked for both the popular defense and the country’s intelligence services.
Fears of increased attacks on press freedom stem from the fact that Al-Ghattas worked as media advisor for the National Security Agency during the era of the former regime, and played a pivotal role in silencing journalists and shutting down newspapers.
Al-Ghattas also played a prominent role in trying to quell the spark of protests in 2018, as he directly supervised the suppression of protesters in the capital, Khartoum, and arrested dozens.
Meanwhile, Mohammed Nafie, son of the dissolved National Congress Party leader Nafie Ali Nafeh, was returned to his job at the Ministry of Energy, after he was dismissed by the Empowerment Removal Committee earlier along with a number of employees belonging to the former regime.
The Empowerment Removal Committee dismissed hundreds of whom it described as “People’s Defense elements” from the disbanded regime era, a “secret intelligence service” affiliated with the party of ousted president Omar al-Bashir which had enjoyed wide powers in the pursuit, arrest, and torture of regime opposers.
It also committed widespread violations, including killing many people.
The committee also recovered companies and shares owned by leaders of the former regime, after proving that they had obtained them illegally, using their influence in the ruling authority at the time.
It also confiscated heavy machinery seized by the Falol, which were part of the “Gezira Project”; the largest agricultural project in Sudan.
A member of the Sudanese Teachers’ Committee, Qamaria Omar, revealed that the coup plotters empowered the Falol in the Ministry of Education, which led to the decline of the ministry’s work and its return to the “era of levies and financing its projects from the pockets of parents.”
She confirmed to AlTaghyeer that the return of the former regime’s elements to the ministry has a very negative effect because they returned bearing anger over the post-revolutionary changes.
Qamaria said that they had canceled all revolutionary decisions that would lead to a radical change in education and help remove the systematic sabotage carried out by the former National Salvation regime against the ministry from the curricula.
“Now, these administrations have returned to exploit the education sector for their own benefit, bringing back things such as spending on class exams, for primary, secondary, and interim levels.”
She explained that ex-Prime Minister Hamdok’s time, the ministry obligated the states to print exams and provide them free of charge to all students, but now the full cost of the exams has returned to burden the parents, in addition to the ministry’s petty cash given as “contribution” from both students and parents.
Breaking Out the Former Regime
Not only did the putschists return individuals and leaders of the former regime to state institutions, but they also worked to break-out the in the regime accused of the 1989 coup, having some of them from deported from Kober Prison to Alia Hospital in preparation for their smuggling outside the country so to help them evade justice.
Sources told AlTaghyer that the ousted Omar al-Bashir, his deputy, Bakri Hassan Saleh, and Youssef Abdel-Fattah are all currently in Alia Hospital and enjoy all forms of comfort and freedom of movement inside the hospital.
They explained that al-Bashir, despite rumors, does not suffer from any illness presently, and that only his blood pressure is irregular.
The sources did not rule out the probability of al-Bashir being smuggled abroad, especially in light of the fragile security state in the country.
Earlier press reports revealed there had been an attempt to smuggle al-Bashir and the symbols of his regime from Kober Prison.
The Sudanese police, at that time, stated that they had not detected such an attempt, and that the forces charged with guarding and securing Kober Prison were performing their duty efficiently, professionally, and vigilantly.
Return of the Ousted Regime
Al-Moez Hazrat, a member of the Alliance for Freedom and Change, told AlTaghyeer that “since the October 25 coup, all the National Salvation leaders arrested in reports, headed by the ousted president, have been languishing in luxurious suites in Alia Hospital.”
“Perhaps this agreement is a prelude to their release or smuggling,” he continued.
He believes that the elements of the now defunct regime are currently holding “all the joints of the state.”
Hazrat revealed to AlTaghyeer that all property confiscated by the Empowerment Removal Committee had been returned, and that “this is a return of the deposed regime with the same old faces.”
He stressed that the Sudanese people have become conscious, and such things cannot be simply get by them, explaining why the resistance against the al-Burhan coup continues until this moment.
“The peoples will win, no matter how long it takes.”
The elements of the former regime returned to their jobs, accompanied by celebrations and lamb sacrifices for large feast.
The moment they returned to work, they returned to their old behavior of “ruling in the name of religion,”
They were also greeted with old jihadist songs, Allahu Akbars, and prostrations of thanks.
Sudanese social networking circles described these actions as “provocative to the revolution and to the martyrs and their families,” and stressed that the Sudanese people, who have been pouring into the streets of Sudan since that fateful October al-Burhan coup, “will not rest until the coup d’etat and their supporters are overthrown in order to avenge the martyrs and restore power to the Sudanese people.”
Memory of “Mile 40”
The exit of the remnants of the former regime to the public seemed clearer when a number of young Islamists affiliated with the National Congress and the People’s Security celebrated the anniversary of “Mile 40” and their comrades who were killed in the South Sudan war.
The memory had rarely been publicly celebrated the past three years after the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir and his cohorts, but the Burhan coup gave them a chance to celebrate it in full view of everyone at the Freedom Square, chanting jihadist songs in memory of their comrades.
The sources said that the celebration was addressed by the Islamic leader, Naji Abdullah, and urged the Islamist youth to the “the necessity of returning to work in public, and carrying the message for which the martyr brothers sacrificed.”
Journalist and political analyst Maher Abu Al-Goukh argued that the return of the former regime elements was an attempt by the putschists to create a political mount that would both protect their coup and cooperate with them.
He told AlTaghyeer that this transformation confirms that the putschists have completely abandoned the political support of the groups around them, from the armed movements that signed the Juba Peace, and social incubators from native administrations and Sufi orders.
He added that this also appears in the signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement acknowledging that the political and economic situation in the country is headed towards a complete collapse,
Abu Al-Goukh said that “the return of the remnants of the former regime will not benefit official state institutions, because the dilemma of the public sector did not come as a result of expel ling employees of the former regime, but it is linked to structural problems inherent to civil service that has affected its efficiency, effectiveness, and performance quality. “
He explained that the return of Falol is likely to create problems within the government because a number of employees have been promoted and assumed positions,” saying that therefore there “will be large numbers” of people who would demand a hefty fee for their “high qualifications”, and this, coupled with the current economic situation, will exhaust the national budget.
On the empowerment dismantling committee having been accused of costing the civil service its efficiency due to its work in dismissing former regime agents, Abu Al-Goukh said that it was “Al-Bashir himself who created a parallel state, not the transitional government.”
Abu Al-Goukh said that “even if Al-Bashir’s ambitions of consolidating power again were reach, it would not prevent this coup from reaching its inevitable destiny; to be defeated.”
“The current conditions in Sudan are not the same as those during the last months of Al-Bashir’s rule, neither at the political and economic level, nor in terms of demands for rights and the regional level.”
“If al-Bashir and his regime had found local, regional, and international acceptance, they would not have ended up the way they did on April 11,” he continued. “If it would have been beneficial for his regime to continue, he would have been ruling today in his palace, not staying in [Kober] prison.”
“Therefore, re-using the defunct regime is an option that has been tried, failed, and will fall again.”